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Under the,\merican Rule, one
who prevails n a civil action is not
entitled to recover attomey fees absent a statute or contract provision
that specifically provides for them.1
Consequentl¡ few victrms of wrongdoing who seek recompense in the
civil system are ever made whole.
Plamtiffs' attorneys know well the
irony of perpetually seekrng to obtarn
for their clients compensation that is
merely adequate while the corporate
media have the public believrng that
plaintiffs ur the civil system are winners of a liability jackpot.
Justice requires an award of
attomey fees and costs in many insurance cases especially where the insurarìce consumer, be she the insured or
the victim of the insured tortfeasor,
must engage lfr civil litigation to
obtain the benefit promised by the
insurer. That benefit may be firstparty medical coverage, a promise of
defense, indemnity, fire insurance
proceeds, uninsured motoris t coverage, or a host of other benefits for
which the insured bargarned to assure
security from risk. From the pornt of
view of the rnjured plaintiff, the
benefit may be the liability coverage
of the wrongdoer.
The law governing attorney fees
in actions against insurance companies is fat ftom uniform

n

the

United States. One state may deny
attomey fees outright to an insured
plaintiff who prevails in a coverage
dispute, while another awards attorney fees outright in the same situation, and a third awards them only if
the insurer initiated the action and
not the insured. While I will, in this
article, refer to the general common
law rules as set forth in some of the
insurance treatises, the main focus
will be to review the law regarding
awards of attorney fees in cases
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agarnst insurance cornpanies by rnsur-

ance consumers or third-party claimants as developed by the Montana
Supreme Court.
Fo r tunately, Montana corrìrrìon
law recognizes equitable exceptions

to the American Rule,2 in cases involvrng insurance. As can be seen in
the recent decisions

of Mt. lYest

Fatm Buteau Mut. fns. Co. v
Brewet,3and Ttustees of fndíana
UnÍvetsÍty u Buxbaum,a the Montana Supreme Court has developed a
srgnificant remedial body of law that
can be used to obtain attorney fees
and costs in cases where civil litiga-

tion has been necessary to secure the
insurance benefit.

I7e might consider those cases in
categories: First, there are the refusal
to defend cases in which the insurance comparìies flatly deny coverage

under liability policies ard, therefore,
refuse to defend their insureds from
the civil clarms for wrongdoing. In
those cases, the insureds suffer damages in the form of attorney fees
incurred n defending themselves.
Second, the insureds who are
refused defense may suffer another
distinct set of attorney fees, those

incurred in bringrng actions agarnst
the insurers for z declantion that the
insurers must defend or had the duty

to defend.

Third, there are the

cases

of

the

insurers'refusal to indemnify the
insureds for the loss suffered ur
settlement or verdict. In such situations, the carriers may still undertake
defense under reservation of rights,
in effect warning the insureds that,
because of the insurers'perceived
lack of coverage or coverage disputes, they may have no duty to pay
any resulting judgments or verdicts.
In those situations, the insureds must
assurne the insurers intend to pay

nothnrg and must anùyze whether it
is wise to let them continue in defense under reservation of right.s In
such situations, the insured tortfeasors may suffer attorney fees in
engaging in declaratory actions initiated by them or their insurers to
determine coverage for indemnity. Or
the insureds may negotiate their own
settlements by assigning their rights
to indemnity to the rnjured claimants

who wrll bring third-pàrry declara;roty
or bad faith actions. In either case,
someofle is going to suffer attomey
fees and costs in securing the ndemruty benefit from the insurers.
Fourth is the category of actions

brought under the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act6 to enforce any
promise of benefit made by the insurer, not just defense or indemnity.
In each case, the insured or a thirdparty will likely hire an attorney and
expend attoffiey fees and costs in

forcng the carrier to pay the benefit.
The question is whether the carrier
can be made to pay tn those circumstâflces.

Frnally, there is the category

of

"bad fairh" refusal of benefits in
which the insurer's act of refusing
benefits of any kind is deemed urrreasonable or in some other way reflects
bad faith in making the decision to
refuse. This category has two subcategories, first-party cases and thirdpa(ty cases, which may be treated
differently when attomey fee awards
are at issue.
This artrcle will briefly examine
the way the Montana Supreme Court
has treated these categories in determrning whether insurance consumers
have the remedy of an award of
attomey fees and costs. The reader is

forewarned that the task of categoúzcases is not as simple as it

trg the

seems, The decisions are not always
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clear on whether the proceeding to
determine coverage ot benefits was
of the nature of a declantory judgment action. Also unclear may be
whether the attomey fees sought were
for defending the undedyrng tort

action or for bnnging or defending
the declaratory judgment action involvrng the insurer and the theory on
which the court awarded the fees,

Attorney fees as compensatory
damages for refusal to defend the
first-party insured
Generally, when an insurer

wrongly refuses to defend, the insured can recover the attorney fees he
expended in defending himself in the

undedying action on the theory that
such fees are direct damages caused
by the insurer's breach of contract.T

Later in this article I will discuss
whether the insured can recover attorney fees and costs if he prevarls in a
declaratory action to secure the coverage and defense refused.

In Montana, the Supreme Court

of attorney fees
of the insurer's

has approved awards

suffered as a result
refusal to defend. For instance, in

1,967, the court awarded costs of
defense to State Farm's insured, Thompson, in the case of St. Paul Firc

and Marine Ins. Co.

u Thomp-

son.8 State Farm had refused to defend Thompson in an indemnity

action brought against hrm by St.
Paul, the insurer for a jornt defendant. As a result of the refusal, the
insured, Thompson, suffered damages n the form of attorney fees and
costs in defendng himself against
the clarm brought by his co-defendant. Thompson filed a thitd-party
complaint against State Farm in the
indemnity action brought by St. Paul,

prevailed, and was awarded attorney
fees a¡rd costs. We should note that
Thompson's claim for attorney fees
against State Farm involved those
incurred in defending himself but
apparently not those incurred in
pleading and provrng his third-party
complaint.

In

1972, in

lfome Insurance

Company u. PinskÌ Btothets, Inc.,e
Home Insurance Company paid its
insured, Montana Deaconess Hospital in Great Falls, $135,000 for the
loss resulting from a boiler explosion
at the hospital. Home then brought a
subrogation claim against the architects responsible for the hospital
remodeling project involvrng the
boiler. Ironicall¡ those architects
were also Home's insureds who de-

o

my
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all health-care disciplines.
: Available to review and testify
in medical negl¡gence cases.
30 years, 6,000 cases
Member, American College

of Legal Medicine

ffi

rney references statewide

manded that Home defend them
against the subrogation claim. Home
refused defense. Ultìmately, the Montana Supreme Court uphetd the lower
court's summary judgment for the
architects on the ground that Home
could not subrogate against its own
insured rn the first place and had

wrongly refu sed coverage.
The architects sought attorney

for breach of F{ome's
comprehensive liability policy for
failing to defend. The court held that
Home's refusal to defend "constifees and costs

tuted a breach of contract even if
based on an honest mistake, thereby
rendering Home liable for defense
costs resulting from such breach."
This was so, even though there was
no coverage on the second and third
courits

of the complaint. The court

found it impossible to segregate the
attomey fees involved in the covered
as opposed to uncovered clarms and
noted that Home was the "moving
parry" in the litigation causing its
insureds to expend fees in the subrogation action and resultrng cormterclaim for breach of contract.
Accordrngl¡ the court remanded for
trial court determrnation of damages
that presumably could include all of
the insured's attorney fees.
Cleady this case stands for the
proposition that one can obtain attorney fees suffered as compensatory
damages for the insurer's failure to
defend and the insured's resultant
necessity of defending himself Interestingly, it is also a case in which the
insurer initiated an action n which
the parties litrgated the legal issue of
whether the insured could subrogate
against its own insured. In that respect, it is a declaratory action in
which the insured likely was awarded
attomey fees involved tr seeking
coverage.

In the L984 decision of Truck
Insatance Exchange v Wolstad,lo
the insured, Äction Sales, was sued by
the personal representative of
Wolstad v¡ho was burned and died in

ii

Pace 32

Tnrlr

TnBruos

-

Sun¡rvrBn 2003

the explosion of a propane fumace
rn a pickup-carnper sold by Action
Sales. Truck Insurance Exchange
refused Action Sales any defense on
the ground that the explosion occurred after the policy expired. Action asserted that the "Completed
Operations Hazard" ønd

'?roducts Hazatt'portions of the policy pro-

âttomey fees in declaratory actions
involving insurance. In 1978, the
court, in Foy u Andetson,lT esrablished that it could award attorney
fees in a declaratory action under its
inherent equity power. In that case,
njured plarntrffs, Foy and Gilreath,

brought clarms against
Anderson, the driver who
rear-ended them. A third
passeflger in the Gilreath
vehicle, I(aren Eggan, apparently suffered some injury but chosé not to bring
claim. Driver Anderson

On appeel, the court upheld
the award of attorney fees in

vided occurrence type
coverage, because those

portions of the policy
were in effect when the
product was sold.

Action Sales retarned

the declaratory ecü¡on citing
its þower to grant compleüe
relief under its eguity power,"

its own counsel to defend
the wrongful death action
That counsel subsequently advised
TIE of a settlement offer from
Wolstad and demanded that TIE
either settle the case or unconditionally assume the defense. TIE refused
to respond or defend. The company
also refused to respond to Action
Sale's later warning that rt planned to
enter into a consent judgment and
covenant not to sue with Wolstad for
ff225,000. TIE then filed the declara-

tory judgment action to determine
coverage, and the injured Wolstad, as
assþee of the rights of Action Sales
agarnst TIE, successfully established
coverage via summary judgment.
\)Tolstad and Action Sales then moved

to compel payment of the judgment
by TIE, and ,A.ctron Sales sought
attomey fees and costs.
The court cited the fact rhat
Action made repeated unsuccessfi;l
requests of Truck Insurance Exchange to assume the defense and
said, "In light of Truck's breach, we
find Truck liable for Action's atomey
fees and costs in defense

those for handling the declaratory
judgment action. The legal ground
for awarding attomey fees on the
declaratory judgment are not stated,
nor are the awarding of the fees the
subject of the dissents of Justrces
Weber, Gulbrandson and Shea.

of this

matter." The order simply states:

"Affirmed and remanded to the District Court for determinztíon of attomey fees and costs." It isn t clear
whether this was a case in which the
court awarded both the attorney fees
suffered as conttact damage for the
^
insurer's refusal to defend as well as
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sought defense and indem-

nity from his insurer, Farm-

Attorney fees incurred in prevailing in first-party declaratory
iudgment actions for coverage
or benefits
Most Americafl courts have rejected attempts by rnsureds to obtain
their attorney fees in proceedrngs
under declaratory judgment statutes.ll
Nauonall¡ the majority rule refuses
zttoffiey fees to the insured in declatatory actions over coverage.l2
Under the "New York Rule," the
insured cannot recover in the action
he rnitiates even if he prevads against
the insurer in enforcing coverage.l3
Nevertheless, nationally there is a
split of authority on recovery of
attorney fees n declaratory actions
over the insurer's duty to defend.ta If
the insured has to defend himself
where the insurer takes the legal
action to avoid coverage, and the
insurer is found to have wrongfully
refused coverage, courts do award the
ihsured attomey fees.15 Those courts
that deny the fees generally follow the
,{merican Rule that, absent statutory
or contractual provision, there can be
no recovery of attorney fees.16
(1) Under equity power to remedy
unfairness in a declaratory action
Montana has developed a significant body of common law allowing

ers Insurance Exchange,
which refused. Anderson then

brought a declantory judgment action against Farmers and included as
party defendant the unwilllng l(aren
Egg , who subsequently prevailed
on the court to dismiss her and award
her attorney fees incurred in getting
out

of the declaratory action.
On appeal, the court upheld the

award

of

attomey fees rn the declaratory action citing its 'þower to grant
complete relief under its equity
power." The court found persuasive
the fact that Anderson made Eggan a
party defendant when she had no
intention of making a clatm and sard,
"If defendant Eggan is dismissed
from the case and not awarded attorney fees, she will not be made whole
or retumed to the same position as
before plaintiff Anderson attempted
to bring her into the,lawsuit." Obviousl¡ Foy wasn't a fìrst-party insured,
but the case reflects the theory that
the court can, within its inherent
equity pov/er, award attorney fees rn a
declantory action involving insurance
in order to avoid unfairness.
(2) As "reasonable expenses

incurred by the insured at the
request of the insurertt
The Montana Federal District
Court awarded attotney fees to the
insured in a declantory action on the
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theory that his expenses in defendrng
the action were expenses incurred by
the insured at the request of the
insurer under the cooperation and
reimbursement clause of the policy.
In Amedcan States fns. Co. u

Angstman Motors, Inc.r7& a grart
truck at Havre was involved in a
collision during harvest that resulted
in injury to occupants of
an automobrle. At the trme
of the collision, the grarn
truck was the subject of an
uncompleted "sale," since
the truck was being used
on "approval," the buyer
had only paid half the price
in cash, and no title transfer
documents had been ex-

".American has, by naming him as
party defend ant, required that Johnson
make an appearance in a case which
involves only the dutìes of the opposrng carriers." The court deemed

the question of which carrier must
coverJohnson to be "collateral" to
the duties American owed Johnson
and ruled that his carrier must pay his

gatap:e liability policy or the
customer's personal auto policy
would cover the damage caused when

the customer neglþntly caused a
collision while drivin g a'loaner"
from Atkin Volkswagen. The plaintiff sued the defendant customer,
McClaffert¡ who tendered the suit to
Universal Underwriters Insurance
Company for defense.
Universal refused, and
McClafferty's personal
carcie4 Safecq defended
and settled the case. Meanwhile, Universal settled
with its insured gange for

Johnson sought aütorney fees
from his insurer, Amet¡cen, on
the theory thet they were
feesoneÞle costs inc¡rrted et
ühe request of the compeny.

a

quest

of American." The court

awarded Johnson the attorney fees

reasoning that American had named
ur: a dispute that really
only affected the two carriers. The
issue wasn't whether he had coverage,
but which of the two carriers had

him a party

primary liability. The court said,
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of the damage to

McClafferty on behalf

ecuted. Consequendy, a

dispute developed ovet
whether the buyer Johnson's insuter,
American States, or the dealer's insurer, USF&G, would have primary
liability. The buyer's insurer, American States, sued USF&G and its ov¡n
rnsured, Johnson, in a declantory
judgment action in federal court to
determine which canier had primary
responsibility. The court ruled that
the truck still belonged to the dealer,
that the dealer's insurer, USF&G had
primary coverage, and that American
States had excess coverage.
Johnson sought attomey fees
from his insureE American, on the
theory that they were reasonable costs
incurred ât the request of the company. Johnson based his claim on the
policy clause that provided that his
insurer would reimburse him for loss
of wages or salary in corurection with
his attendance at hearings or trials
and "to pay all reasonable expenses
which the insured incurs at the re-

portion

the "loafler," after which
Atkin Volkswagen sued

attorney fees. The court said,
"Johnson is entitled to recover reaszr¿able zttorney fees under the theory of

Standard AccÍdent fns, Co. of
Detroit u lfuil,91 F.Supp. 65 (S.D.
Cal. 1950)." It is rnterestrng that in
other jurisdictions this theory that the
insured's attorney fees are incurred at
the request of the insurer and reimbursable under the expenses clause
of the policy is roundly rejected and
has been chancteitzed as "manifestly
unreasonable" by Wmdt.le This holding of the Federal Court in Montana
does not appea;r to be supported by
any Montana Supreme Court authority.
One could formulate from the
Angstman Motots case a rule that,
where the dispute is between carriers,
and the insured is entitled to defense
and indemnity ir ary event, he
should recover attomey fees if he is
mzde a party to a resultìng declaratory judgment action.
On the other hand, in BíII AtkÍn
Volkswagen, fnc. u. McClaffetqr,2o
the court refused to grarit attomey
fees in an action brought to determrne which of two auto carriers had
prímary coverage liability and which
was excess. In Atkin Volkswage4
the issue was whether the dealer's

of

itself and Universal to
recover the damage suffered to the
"loafler." McClafferty sued Universal
by third-party complaint clarmrng to
be Universa.lt insured and sought to
recover Safeco's money paid to the
plaintiff, Ogrin. McClafferty also
sought attorney fees and costs under
the law

of lfome Ins. Co. u Pínski.

The Montana Supreme Court
held that Universal's coverage of the
"IoÀnef'was mandatory but that the
two carriers would be pro rata responsible for primary coverage. Havrng so held, the court refused
McClafferty's request for attorney
fees and costs. The court found distinguishing the fact that Pinskí tnvolved a suit by the insurer against its
own insured, which the court in

Atkín Volkswagen described as "a
wrongfrrl attempt by an insurance
company to bring an action which
violates basic equitable principles of
sound public policy." The court said
of Atkin, "This is essentrally a suit
berween two insurance companies to
determine which of ¡,¡¡o applicable
ovedapping policies provides cover^ge'"

It appears from reading the
decision that actions taken by
McClafferty may have been taken by

Tnnr
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his insurer in his name for the benefit
of insurer and client. This was not a
case in which the insured had to defend hrnself in the face of a refusal
to defend; to defend a declatatory
action brought by his nsurer agamst
him; or to bring a declaratory action
to force his insurance carrier to defend or indemnif'. In short, if the
action involves a coverage dispute
between two carriers, neither will be
awarded attorney fees.

(3) As remedy for wrongful
conduct of the insurer
In Líndsay DtiIIíng & ConttactÍng u. United States FidelÍty
and Guatanty Co.r" USF&G refused to defend its insured, Lindsay
Drilling, on claims that the company
salted core samples to make it appear
that certain mining properties contained more minerals than in fact
existed. In a case filed under the Uniform DeclaratoryJudgment Act by
Lindsay Drilling the District Court
held for USF&G. F{owever, the Montana Supreme Court reversed, holding
that the counterclaim alleging the
salting did state claims covered by
USF&G's policy. The court held the
insurer "liable for reasonable attorney
fees, expenses and court costs occa-

sioned thereby" cit:ng

lfome Insut-

tfl 1992, the court,

as a prerequistte to

of attomey fees in a declaratory action that didnt involve
insurance, required that the prevailing
party show he was "forced into a
frivolous lawsuit and must incur attomey fees to dismrss the claim." This
was the "frivolous or malicious action" requirement for obtaining an
an award

an insurance declaratory action. However, in 2001, the court applied the
"frivolous or malicious action" restriction in an insurance rnteqpleader

showng

action

n NatÍonal

Cas. Co. u

Amedcan Bankerc fns. Co. of
Flodda,ts There, Summers, a homeowner insured his premises with National Casualty intending to replace
his American Bankers policy. However, through some error, he paid
premiums and kept both policies rn
effect. When his place burned, a dispute arose over which carrier was
primary under the "other insurance"
Bankers paid the
clause.

'{merican

insured's loss, while National Casualty

nterpleaded its benefrt naming
American Bankers and Surnmers in
the declaratory action. American
Bankers prevailed in its claim to the
fire insurance proceeds interplead by

declaratory judgment action brought
by the insured. Simply put, LÍndsay
DdllÍngfrts under the insurance
exception to the American Rule.

malicious," the insured can invoke the
insurance exception to the American
Rule and will be entrtled to attomey
fees. However, the corollary that the

(4) Where the insured is required
to defend a "frivolous or

malicious" declaratory action
brought by the insurer
In Goodovet u LÍndey's, Inc.n
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claratory Judgement Act, S 27-8-313.

The remedy of award of attorney
fees under that provision only requires a showing of "necessary or
proper," and the parameters suggested
by the court as guidelnes for that
standard dort't appear to require any

was remanded for determination of
the attomey fees, expenses and costs.
It appears that the attomey fees in
question were those involved in the

wrongful refusal to defend Lindsay
which led to this âction." The case

if the attorney fees are
sought under the "supplemental relief" provision of the Uniform Deabandoned

award of attomey fees. Arguabl¡
because Goodovetwas not an insurance case, its law would not apply in

National Casualty Company. However, the court refused Americân
Banker's request for attorney fees and
costs on the ground that the action of
National Casualty was not "frivolous
or malicious."
l7e can conclude that, if the insurer involves the insured in a declantory action that is "frivolous or

ance Company u PÍnskÍ Brothers,
Inc.The court's stated basis for the
award was that"Ir was USF&G's

IInívercÍty v Buxbaurn, (2003)'z4 the
"frivolous or malicious" standard is

insured's request for attomey fees
must be based on "frivolous or malicious" conduct of the rnsurer in
bringing the declaratory action may
not be true. Under the recently de.

cided case

of

Ttustees of fndÍana

of "ftivolous or malicious."

Attorney fees for prevailing
against a self-insured party on
covefage
In Ttustees of fndiana UnÍver-

sÍty u Buxbaum,2s the sued party
who sought defense and indemnity
coverage from Indiana University and
prevailed in the coverage dispute filed
by the University was confronted
with multrple problems in recovering
attoffiey fees. First, Indiana Universiry was self insured, so it was not an
insurance company and did not have
an insurance policy contract with the
party demanding defense. Accordingly, the insurance exception to the
American Rule did not apply to provide a legal basis for attorney fees.
In the case, three Indiana students and another Indiana resident
were involved in the rollover of a

Chevrolet Suburban owned by Indiana University ând operated rn Montarr on â sufiuner research proiect.
Three deaths and a serious injury
resulted. In the ensuing lawsuit, the

of

the driver, Jones, demanded
defense and rndemnity from Indiana
University as a self-insurer. Multiple
issues developed regarding the
University's duty to indemnify the

estate

responsible driver, the University's
stahrs as an insurer, and coverage.
Indiana University brought a declantory action against the Jones estate
and the estate of deceased passenger,
I(rueger, to resolve the issues.
After denying cross motions for
summary ludgment, the court heard

Tnr¡,r TnBNos -
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the rnatter rn non-jury trial and found

for the estates over the University of
Indiana. The yudge awatded the estates their costs, expenses, and attorney fees but later altered the
judgment to delete those amounts on
the ground that there was flo contractual or stahltory basis for their av¡ard.
Though the court found an award of
attorney fees to be within its equitable power under the 1978 case of
Foy u Anderconi6 it also found the
University's action did not meet the
"frivolous or malicious action" restriction placed on that equitable
pou/er to award attomey fees as set
forth in National Cas. Co. u.
American Bankerc.z1 There berng
no basis fot an âttorney fee award
under an insurance exception, the
estates argued that the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act provided for

attorney fees.
Consequently, the sole issue on
appeal was whether the District
Court erred when it denied the Pre-

vailing estates their attorney fees. The
estates argued that the court could
award attorney fees as "costs" under
S27-B-311 of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, since $27-8-311
provides for recovery of "costs" in
the following language: "In any proceeding under this chapter the court
may make such awatd of costs as
may seem equitable and just." The
estates further argued that the attorney fees could be awarded as
"supplemental relief" under $27-8313 of the ,\ct, which provides:

Further relief based on a declarztory judgment or decree
may be granted whenever necessary or proper. The application therefore shall be by

petitron to a court having ¡urisdiction to grant the relief. If
the application be deemed sufficient, the court shall, on reasonable notice, require any
adverse party whose rights
have been adjudicated by a
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declaratory ludgment or decree to show cause why further relief should not be

granted forthwith.
One problem with any theorY
based in the UDJA was that the Montana Supreme Coutt had exPlicitlY
stated in 1978 in State ex rel. Dept.

of lfealth and Enuitonmental
Sciences v Líncoln Countyr2s trr
1994ln Mcl(amey u Statele and in
1998 in Dotwart u CanawaY,3o that
there is no provision for an award of
attomey fees in a declaratory judgment action. This may seem surprising given cases like LÌndsay Drilling
mentioned above where the insureds
recoveted attomey fees in declaratory
actions to secure defense from their
insurers. However, those recoveries
were premised on the insurance exception to the American Rule and not
on any provision of the UDJA. Consequently, in

Indiana UnivercÍty, the

court had to reevaluate its position
and analyze u¡hether attomeY fees
were awardable under theories that
they were "costs" under $27-8-3Lt or

"supplemental relief" under $27-B31.3.

The court's review of precedent
cleady established that attorney fees
are not included in "costs" in Mon-

taîa afld hence, not available under
527-8-311. Flowever, the court held
that attomey fees could be awarded
as "supplemental relief" under $278-313 if the court determrned that
they were "necessary or proper"
within the language of the statute. In
order to arcíve at that result, the court
overruled the Líncoln CountY'
McKamey and Dotwart cases insofar as they rndicated attorney fees
could not be recovered in declaratory
actions.

The court then wresded with
what it termed the nebulous nature

of

the words "necessary and proper"
to "articulate some tangrble patameters" in awarding attomey fees and
costs. To do so, the court reviewed

the Ohio Appellate Court's 1999 case

of McConneII u lfant SPorrc
Ent37 to arrive at the followng
guidelines or parameters:
1.

Attorney fees are appropriate rn the
"anomalous resulC' circumstance
in which, without an attorneY fee
award, the insured "would have
been worse off than if a declan'
tion of their rights had never been
made." For instance, if the insured
doesn't receive attomey fees ln the
declaratory action and has to bring
abzd furh suit to be made whole,

it is an anomalous result.
2. Attorney fees are appropriate tn

declaratory actions when no other
alternative is available. If the
insured must file z declatatorY
action to obtain the benefìt of the
ihsurance, then attorney fees are
necessary and proper.

if the declatatory action is filed "for PurelY

3. On the other hand,

tactical reasons," attorney fees may
not be appropriate.
Technically, one could argae that

fndíana IJnívetsityis not about
insurance but declaratory iudgment
actions. However, the court used the
case to provide an attorney fee remedy against a self-insurer one week
and cited the case âs a means to pro-

vide attomey fees to a Prevailing

third-party in an insurance declaratory action, MoantaÍn West Fatm
Buteau Mut. fns. Co. u Btewet3z
the next week. In Btewet, the court
declined to expand the Insurance
Exception to the American Rule to
include âttorney fees for third-party
claima¡rts who had no contractual
relationship with the insurer nvolved.
However, the court asserted that its
holdurg "does not leave the
Christensons without recourse in
their attempt to recover their attorney

fees." The court cited the recently
decided Trustees of Indíana Uní'
vercÍty case and said, "$27-8-313,
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MCA, authorizes a court to award
attomeys fees when the court, in its
discretion, deems such an award
'necessary and proper."'The court
remanded Brcwet to the District

Court for a determination of whether
attomey fees and costs \¡/ere "necessary or proper," and in what amount.

In

essence,

IndÍana UnívetsÍty

ptovides an additronal theoretical
basis for an award of attorney fees in
a case that will not fit under the insurarìce exception. The legal import
is clear rnsofar as the rulng will allov¡
âttomey fees where the third-party
has prevailed in the declaratory action
against the insurer. That is a sþif,rcant incentive for the injured third
party who is tempted to file his own
declaratory ¡udgment action.

Attorney fees for refusal to
indemniff the first-party insured
Until recentl¡ the court awarded
attomey fees ln liability coverage
disputes only in those cases of failure
to defend. The court would not

;.$Jst
oa'{

award such fees for failure to mdemnify. The court historically distinguished between the insurer's refusal
to defend, for which it would allow
fees, and the refusal to indemnify for
which it would not. In YouÍsh u
UnÌted Setuices Auto. Asstnr33
USAÂ had refused to rndemnify and
the nsured successfirlly established
right to indemnity in a declaratory
action. In refusing the prevarling
insured's plea for attomey fees, the

court acknou¡ledged the anfrciality
of the distinction berween refusrng
defense and refusng indemnity but
said, "[t]he legislature, not the courts,
must remedy the wrongs created by
this situation." Given the Montana
Legislature's reticence to grânt consumer remedies agarnst insurance.
companies, continued adherence to
that principle of deference would
have prevented any expansion of
attomey fee awards.
Such was the state of Montana
law when the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals looked to Montana law to

decide Troatt

Ins.

Co.3a

u Colorado Westetn
In Ttouft,rhe

in 2001.

insurer agreed to cover the insured
tavern owner, Troutt, for liability
caused by injury arising out of the
sale, service or furnishrng of alcohol.
The clarmant, Engstrand, had most
of his fingers amputated when he
and others were using a mechanical
log splitter behind the tavern premises. Dudng the insurer's investigation of Engstrand's claim, no
disclosure was made to the insurer by
witnesses that alcohol was involved.
Neither did the pleadings make any
such allegation. It became app rent zt
the undedying trial, which the carrier
had refused to defend, that the
tavern's alcohol was signiflrcantly
rnvolved ln the accident. Consequentl¡ after the facl rhe United
States

District Court decided, and the

Nnth Circuit affirmed, that the carrier did have a coverage oblþtion
but did not fail to investigate or
wrongfully refuse to defend. Looking at Montanalaw, the Circuit
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Court followed Youish affitming
that there could be no attorney fees
for a wrongful failure to provide
coverage absent a breach of the duty
to defend.
Fornrnately, the court recently
reassessed its deferral to the legislature in the salutary decision of

Mountain West Fatm Burcau Mut.
Ins, Co. u Btewet3s There, the
court expanded the insurance exception to the American Rule to include
attomey fees expended in establishing
a duty to indemnify. In doing so it
overturned Youish. The court cited
Pence u Fox(1991)136 for the principle that "[t]he courts have the responsibility to reform common law
as justice requires." Because Youish

also rnvolved the question of àttorney fees to secure indemnity, its rule

of legrslative deference was an impediment to any ludicial expansion of
the attomey fee remedy in Brewe4
so that the court overruled it. The
court expressly reiected the "transparent" distinction between an ìnsurer's
refusal to defend for which the common law allowed attomey fees, and a
challenge to existence

of

coverage

for

indemnity for which the courts tradiuonally have refused attorney fees.
Consequently the court said, "v/e
hold that an insured is entitled to
recover attorfley fees, pursuant to the
insurance exception to the ,\merican
Rule, when the insurer forces the
insured to assume the burden of
legal action to obtain the full benefit
of the insurance contract, regardless
of whether the insurer's duty to defend is at issue." While the benefit at
issue in Btewerwas clearþ the duty
to indemnify, it is lnteresting to note
the breadth of the holding which
would appear to apply "when the
insurer forces the insured to assume
the burden of legal action to obtarn
the full benefit of the insurance contract, regardless of whether the
insurer's duty to defend is at issue."
Does the holding apply to any benefit
or just the benefit of indemnity? Are
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"benefit" and "indemnity'' rnterchangeable in this context, since an
insurance benefit ndemnifres the
insured for loss? The language is not
restricted, and the court could easily
have limited the award to legal actions to obtain defense or indemnity.
The problem being remedied in the
holding is forcng the insured "to
assume the burden of legal action to
obtain the full benefit of the rnsurance contract." That problem exists
in many situations where the benefit
is neither defense nor indemnity.
Predictably, the insurers will take the
position that Btewet applies only to
refusal to provide indemniry to a
first-parry insured. It temains for
insurance consumer counsel to establish the limits of this very important
case.

the ever-necessary effort to be made
whole.

In MountaÍn West Fatm Buteau Mut fns. Co. u Btewet31 rhe
parents of the injured minor passenger, Angie Christenson, successfully
pressed the third-party declaratory
action to enforce coverage by Mountain V7est. Havmg prevailed, they
sought attorney fees and costs under
dual theories that (1) the insurance
exception to the American Rule
should be expanded to provide attorney fees to an rnjured third-party who
prevails in an insurance coverage
action against a motor vehicle insurer,
and Q) the "supplemental relief"
provision3s of the Uniform Declara-

toryJudgment Act allows art awzrd
of attorney fees to the third-party
prevailing in such a declaratory action.

The quest for attorney fees in the
third-party action for indemnity
On occasion, when the insured's

liability catrier disputes coverage so
as to deny indemnity, it is the injured
third-party plaintiff who has the most
urgent interest in securing a court
determination of coverage. For instaflce, the first-party insured ma¡ by
reason of insolvenc¡ have nsufficient interest to expend his own
money for attorney fees and costs in
securing the coverage denied by the
insurer. In such a-case, the injured
third-party may have to assume the
burden of forcing a coverage determination. The rnvestment may be
risky, because the carrier's evaluation
ié that there is no coverage, and the
court may agree. In fact, the addi-

tional risk likely falls on the plaintiff's
lawyer who often undertakes the
work of coverage enfotcement under
the standard contingent fee agreement as part of the undedying tort
claim. Nevertheless, because the
,\merican Rule applies rn the undedying tort case, it is in the plaintiff
client's interest to recover reasonable
attorney fees and costs if he or she

prevails in the declaratory action in

As reported above, the court in

Btewet agreed that the insurance
exception to the American Rule
should be expanded to provide for
attomey fee awards rn declaratory
actions for ndemnity. Flowever, the
court declined to expand the exception to nclude declaratory actions on
indemnity brought by third-party
claimants. The court noted that their
decision expandng the insurance
exception to indemnity determinations rested almost entirely upon
authority found rn first-party cases.
The court considered the absence of
the traditional conttactual relationship in third-party cases and found
there was no exploitation of inherently unequal bargaintng power in
such situations, nor was there frustration of any "justiFrable expectation
of insurance protection" held by the
injured third-party. Moreover, the
court refused Christenson's contention that, by enacting compulsory
motor vehicle liability insurance, the
legrslature set a public policy to "extend the right to enforce the insurance contract to injured persons, not
just insureds" thereby raising a justifiable or reasonable expectation on the
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part of the third pafty ot creating a
sort of third-party beneficial interest
in the coverage. This holding is consistent with other jurisdictions. Even
when tort plaintiffs who are named

the insured to retain an
^ttor.ney to obtain the benefits due

under a polic¡ it follows that
the insurer should be liable in
a tort action for that expense.

as party defendants by insurers seek-

ng

a determrnation that there is no

coverage prevail to win coverage,
they are held not to be entitled to

their attorney

fees.3e

Ironically, therefore,
Christenson's crowning achievement
extendurg attorney fee awards to

of

declaratory actions for indemnity in
the Brcwet case did not apply to
Christenson's own third-party claim.
Justice Trieweiler dissented from that
result on the ground that distinguishing between first-party and thirdparty on the issue of whether the
comparìy has a duty to indemnity is
arafrciaJ. Fortunately, the court did
not leave Christensons without temedy regardtrg attorney fees, but
agreed they could be avarlable, rn the
court's discretion, under Christefl son's
second theory of "supplemental
relief " under the Uniform DeclantoryJudgments Act.4 The court cited

fndiana Univercity and remanded
the case for ahearingon whether the
attomey fees were "necessary and

propef" under the "supplemental
relief" provision, S27-B-313 MCA.
All's well that ends well!

Attorney fees for bad faith
refusal

of benefits

Several jurisdictions have
awarded attorney fees where the
insured has prevailed in a coverage
action and the insurer acted in bad
faith in refusing the coverage.al This
exception applies where the "conduct of the insured in refusing a
defense reflects fraud, bad faith, or

stubborn litigrousness ."4 The rule in
the 1985 California case of Btandt

u SupetÍor Court,a3 states the
theory best:
When an insurer's tortlous
conduct reasonably compels

Prcp.42

Unfortunately, in 1986, n Tyne
u Bankerc Life Co,r4 the Montana
Supreme Court said of that quote,
'qü/e have not adopted this policy in
Montana and do not choose to do so
today." The court vacated a District
Court award of roughly $20,000 in
attomey fees assessed against Bankers Life for the company's failure to
pay apptoximately $50,000 in medical
bills. Banker's conduct in the case
ncluded excessive and repeated delays in nvestigation, failute to make a
timely coverage determination,
changrng determinations ofl coverage,
and providrng to a treatment center
written confirmation of coverage and
then revoking coverage while the
insured was in treatment for severe
psychosrs. The jury's award or
$100,000 damages for emotional
distress and $200,000 in punitive
damages reflects the wrongful nature
of Banker's conduct in the case. Nevertheless, the court dechned to adopt
an award of attorney fees for bad

faith conduct.

In

essence,

until the recent deci-

sion in Btewe4 claims for benefits
other than defense were claims for
"indemnity" for which an insured
could not recover attomey fees aftet
prevailing in a declantory action.
Now, with Btewet's rule expanding
the right to attorney fees to those
cases where the insured establishes
the right to "indemnity'' (i.e., reimbursement of any money loss), there
is arguably a basis for allowing attorney fees rn an rndependent tort action
for bad faith.
This issue may be complicated by
the fact that rn 1987, the Montana
legrslature intended to corral all potential claims for bad faith refusal of
benefits under one statute, the "Independent Cause of Action" of MCA

533-1,8-242. The statute doesn't mention attorney fees, but provides rn
pertinent part as follows:

A"

insured or a third-party
claimant has an independent
cause of action aganst an msurer for âctual damages
caused by the insurer's violatron of subsection (1), (4), (5),
(1)

Íulf),or

(13) or 33-1.8-20L.

(4) In an action under this sec-

tion, the court or Jtxy mzy
award such damages as were
proxrmately caused by the vio-

Iation of subsection (1), (4),
(5), (6), (9), or (13) of 33-1820L. Exemplary damages may
also be assessed in accordance

wiú

27-1.-221,.

Based on prior case law, it seems
quite certarn ¡haf "ac[sal damages"
under the statute would have to nclude
the insuredt costs of defense in cases
where the insurer, actrng in bad faith,
has tefused defense. Are the attorney
fees expended tr engaglng in a successfirl effot for court declaration of coverage " actual

damaçs" recoverable

r¡nder the statute? Are altorney fees
expended n enforclng coverage 'þrox-

mately caused" so as to be proper for
award nnder 533-1.8-242 (4)? Those
issues remain to be resolved.

Attorney fees for third-party
bad faith claims
In Mottis u Nationwide Ins.
Co.ras Morirs, a rancher, brought a
third-party action agarnst Nationwide

Insurance Company for its breach of
the Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act6 for its conduct in conductng negotrations in Morris's fire
damage claims agarnst its insured,
Sun River Electric Co-op. The trial
court instructed the jury that, if they
found Nationwide violated its duty
under the statute, they could award
"all losses proximately caused
thereby" and that such award "shall
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rnclude . . . ,\ttomey fees and costs
incurred in prosecuting the lawsuit
against Nationwide's insured, Sun
River Electric Co-op." The only issue
on appeal was whether the court
erred in restrictrng the attorney fee to
the percentage contingent fee agreed
between plaintiff and his lawyer or
whether it should have been the
much larger reasonable fee calculated
on an houdy basis. What appears not
at issue in the case is the premise that
attomey fees in trying the undedyrng
case are recoverable damages where
the insurer has engaged in bad faith
breach of the UTPA by such conduct
as failing to attempt to effectuate
p(ompt and fatt settlement. This case
preceded the "Independent Cause of
Action" statute of 1.987. One can
assert that the case provides authority
for the proposition that attorney fees
incurred rn trying a third-party bad
faith claim for failure to negotiate
should be ncluded in the "actual
damaçs" referred to in the statute.
Moreover, based on ¡he 1.999

Btewington u Employets Firc Ins.
Co.a7 decision, third-party corrunon
law bad faith is sull alve in Montana.
Consequentl¡ in such cases, MoÍtis
is authority for recovering the attorney fees from the undedying action.

Conclusion
The Montana Supreme Court has
developed a srgnif,rcant set of attorney fee remedies in cases in which
insured consumers or third-party tort
victims prevail in legal actions to
establish coverage and right to defense or indemnity. Under basic conftacT.law,when the insurer refuses
defense, the insured is entitled to
recover his costs of defense of the

undedying action as compensatory
damages for breach of contract. A
first-patty insured carl recover attorney fees under the insurance exception to the Ämerican Rule when he
prevails n a declaratory action establishing coverage for defense or for
indemnity. Though a third-party in-
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sured cannot recover attorney fees
under the insurance exception when
he prevails in a declaratory action to

also recover attorfley fees under the

establish coverage for defense or
indemnity, he can recover such fees

corìt(act or an "insurer." The firstpârty msured can make a case lhat
any "independent cause of action"
under $33-18-242 should nclude in
"acf:taf damages" allowed the attorney fees incurred in enforcing the
insurer's promises. The third-party in
zbad faiú action also can make the

under the "supplemental relief" provisions of the UDJA if the attorney
fees are deemed "necessary and

proper" by the court. A party establishing coverage for defense or indemnity agaurst a selfl-insurer can

"supplemental relief" provisions

of

the UDJA even absent an insurance
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for recovery of attorney fees
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incurred as a result of the carrier's
bad faith conduct.
The continued development of
the remedy of attorney fees in cases
agarnst insurers will help resolve the
problem of insurers denying claims
based on the simple economics of
saving money by failing to pay claims.
The powerful attorney fee remedy
makes it possible to take on cases for

13. Id.

case

insurance consumers that would

otherwise lack financial viability.
Review of the Montafla Supreme
Courtt holdings on attomey fee recovery in insura¡rce cases as compared to the general corrìtnort law in
the United States reminds one to take
a minute to feel gratitude for the level
playng field we enjoy in Montana
and the care with which this court
crafts its decisions for justice. r
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